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1. Introduction
Physicians' time is an input in the production of useful hospital
output. This elementary proposition is so obvious that it might be sur-
prising that estimates of hospital production and cost functions for U.S. hos-
pitals have not generally included physicianinputs or any measure of their
opportunity costs. The reason for this omission is not difficultto find;
hospitals in the United States tvDically bill forand compensate only those servicpg
provided by hospital employees or for certain physiciansin specialty depart—
ments such as radiology or pathology. But the bulk of physician services
in the United States are rendered by physicians to theirprivate patients,
for which billing and reimbursement are handled wholly outside thehospital.
Nor do hospitals typically record the amount of time aphysician spends
in the hospital providing services to his patients there.
The purpose of this paper is to present estimates of production functions
for hospitals in which a measure of the level of physicianinput Is utilized.
Since no data on the total number of hours worked by non—salariedphysicians
is available for a large sample of U.S. hospitals, alternativemeasures of
physician input had to be constructed. As these measures are somewhat
imperfect, the results I obtain should be considered tentative andpreliminary.
It Is worthwhile to get some measures of hospital production functions
including physicians' Inputs for two reasons. The first Isthat if the level of
this omitted input is related to the levelof other Included inputs, estimates
of their coefficients will be biased.2
.
Forexample, observed economies of scale might only reflect a systematic
increase in the relative proportions of physician inputs asoutput increases,
with the "true" production function being one of constant ordecreasing
returns to scale.1 The second reason is that estimation of a production
function may permit us to say something about the optimal combination of
productive inputs. There has recently been a considerable amount of research
on the process by which ambulatory care is produced in the United States
and the possibilities of input substitution to increaseoutput and reduce
cost [Reinhardt (1972); Smith, Miller, and Golladay (1972)]. In particular,
this research has concentrated on the extent to which aides could be sub-
stituted for office physician time in the production of output. It is
ironic that the United States non—federal hospital sector, whichuses a
considerably larger share of total medical resources, has not been subject
to the same scrutiny. While there has been some work on the substitution of
non—physician personnel in the hospital, there has been to my knowledge no
empirical estimation using United States data of the possibility of sub-
stituting non—physician for physician inputs in the hospital or vice versa.
Feldstein's (1967) estimates for the (ostensibly)very different hospital
system in the United Kingdom do include a measure of physician input.
This scarcity of effort is not the result of a consensus onappropriate
resource allocation. On the one hand, it may be asserted that physicians
delegate too few tasks within the hospital, just as they appear to do in
1See Pauly and Redisch(1973), esp. p. 88.
.3
private practice. The fear of malpractice charges, the possibility
that "the hospital" will be able to capture monopoly rents that accrUe to
physicians as long as they are nominally in charge of the medical care
given, and the psychic costs of supervision might account for such behavior.
On the other hand, it has been contended that physicians have an incentive to
subtitute hospital inputs for their own to too great an extent. It would
appear appropriate to investigate the matter empirically to determine what
is actually happening.
2. Measures of Physician Input.
The way in which inputs are to be measured when estimating a production
function depends upon the use to which the results are to be put. In an
engineering context, where it is the purely technical relationships that
are of interest, the most appropriate measure would be some index of homo-
geneous productive effort. If, on the other hand, one is interested in
the behavioral response of the system, the appropriate measure is the
level of input that can feasibly be manipulated by the decision—maker.
In more concrete terms, whether one wishes to measure labor input by
minutes actually worked at various tasks or by hours of work for which
full wages are received depends upon whether or not a feasible control
mechanism exists for monitoring, controlling, and paying for only minutes
of actual work. (This observation probably explains why task—analysis
studies, such as Smith et.al., tend to show higher productivity for
physician aides than do cross—sectional studies such as those of Reinhardt.
In the former case, there is no allowance for non—working free time or
waiting, while in the latter an hour of "work" really represents only the
average fraction of that hour devoted to productive activity.) Even this
states the matter too simply, since what is feasible may often times be4
too costly, and the actual methods of control and reimbursement (and hence
the actual allocation of effort) may vary widelyamong occupations, firms,
or skill levels.
All of this discussion is by way of elaborate rationalization for the
use in the production function estimates that follow of the number of
physicians available to provide care, rather than actual hours worked. The
concrete reason for this is the unavailability of hours—worked data, but the
reason for continuing with the analysis is that, at the present time,
the most that might be manipulable from a public policy viewpoint is the
number of physicians in an area or on a hospital staff, not the number of
hours the physician spends at the hospital. In general, the kind of
question to be posed is if one pours additional physicians into a hospital's
cachement area, or places additional physicians on its staff, what effect
will this have, ceteris pàribus, on the hospital's output? Put anotherway,
the question is that of how physicians affect hospital productivity.
While allegations of physician overuse of hospital inputs are common, con-
crete description of the form this overuse might take are less common. The
possiblity of overuse is probably most transparent for hospital—employed
physicians; they can be substituted for the time of private practice physicians,
and one suspects that there is not an offsetting diminution in fees charged
by the private practice physician. A similar argument might be made with
respect to nurses; they can perform actions which can save the attending
physician the time and trouble of making a visit to the patient. The argument
that when nurses are scarce, physicians will end up making more visits is a
little weaker, but perhaps plausible, especially if one adds the notion of
"highly skilled" nurses.5
Another way in which physicians substitute for hospital inputs can be
found in Feldstein, "By increasing the number of doctors, for instance,
a hospital may be able to shorten the length of patient stay and thus
decrease the input of beds for a given output." [Feldstein (1967),p. 93]. While
Feldstein's study referred to hospitals in the U.K., the same sort of
reasoning might be applied to hospitals in the U.S., and to other hospital
inputs (nurses, for instance) as well. The story here would seem to
be that either rate of recovery or delay in performing procedures can
be affected by the number of physicians. Where the number of staff members
are few, rounds may be less frequent, and patients may have to wait in
bed for the physician to come by to order procedures, perform operations,
or sign discharge forms. One of the things I shall be interested in is
whether any effect of physicians on output does come through length of stay.
3. The Model.
What the hospital might be thought to maximize is a subject of contro-
versy. The most commonly suggested maximand is some measure of output
which enters the administrator's utility function (Feldstein, 1971; Newhouse,
1970). I have suggested elsewhere (Pauly and Redisch,l973) that it might be
appropriate to view hospitals as being run in the interests of their physician
staffs. Accordingly, the hospital will maximize whatever its staff physicians
maximize. A reasonable maximand for physicians would be a utility function in
money income and leisure, as suggested by Reinhardt. Assuming that all
staff physicians have the same utulity function, the hospital would maximize
physician utility subject to market and time and constraints and the production
function:6
.
(1) h= f (M, L, K)
where N is the amount of physician Inputs, L is a vector of non—physician
labor inputs, and K is a vector of non—labor inputs. Since it may be
reasonable to assume that input prices vary widely, that the level of
physician inputs is almost exogenous, and that hospital decisions on input
combinations may differ because of differential coverage, problems of
simultaneous equation bias should not be severe. A more serious problem is
whether one should assume that, once the level of inputs is chosen, output
is indeed maximized. If hospitals differ in their productive efficiency,
and if some maximization process analagous to profit or utility—maximization
is going on, the resulting coefficients will be subject to simultaneous
equations bias. Both the output—maximization models and a physician—income
maximization model would suggest that maximization occurs. But if physicians
maximize utility rather than profit, and if the variations in taste for
leisure and input prices are large relative to the variation in productive
efficiency, bias should not be severe.
In short, it would appear that the same assumptions that were made by
Reinhardt to justify his ambulatory care production function estimates can
be made here, and that the results will have the same degree of veracity. The
fact that the sample hospitals vary considerably in size because of differences
in sizes of the population to be served is another reason why outputs should
vary primarily for reasons other than variations in productive efficiency.
Finally, Since I am primarily interested in the ratios of Input coefficients,
simultaneous equations bias in returns to scale estimates less of a problem.
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There is, however, one additional problem in the hospital estimates.
It is likely that the degree of technical efficiency will be related to the
number of physicians, because of the difficulty of coordinating a larger
number of physicians. Since the data to be used do not permit physicians
to be varied without also changing the number of physicians, there is the
possibility that the effect of physician input on output is understated.
There are two versions of the physician utility maximization model. In
one, physicians are assumed to cooperate perfectly in choosing input com-
bination and output. In the other, imperfect cooperation by physicians implies
that physicians may engage in behavior which, while individually rational,
leads to undesired results for the group of all physicians.
In the first model, it is easy to show that the existence of cost—
reimbursement hospitalization insurance, which covers about 90 percent of
inpatient hospital care in the United States, will lead "the hospital," as
personified in its (non—salaried) physician staff, to use too much hospital
Input relative to physician inputs. Consider first the case in which there
is no insurance coverage of physician fees. Using more hospital imputs and
less physician time Input than the optimal combination will lead to higher
total costs (hospital plus physician) for a given level of output. The
reduced opportunity costs of physician time are more than offset by higher
hospital input costs. However, the rise in hospital input costs raises
Insurance reimbursement to the hospital—physician cooperative, and this will,
at least In initial departures from the optimum, more than offset any
increases in total costs. In effect, if insurance covers 90 percent of
hospital costs, the perceived cost to the cooperative of hospital inputs
is 10 percent of their true cost. Hospital inputs will be substituted for8
. forphysician inputs to a greater extent than is efficient.
If physician fee insurance is present, it may provide an offsetting
incentive to substitute physician for hospital inputs, but only if insurance
reimbursement rises when physician input rises. This will not occur at
all under indemnity insurance, which is a common method of fee insurance.
It will not occur under insurance which pays the "reasonable and customary"
fee unless that fee can be made to vary with physician time input. While
some extra time might be reimbursable as additional procedures, not all will.
Consequently, physician fee insurance, which is not as extensive as hospital-
ization insurance anyway, will not fully offset the effect of hospitalization
insurance on input combinations.
The imperfect cooperation version of this model suggests thatoveruse will
also arise if the hospital does not or cannot price at marginal cost. Then
each physician will ignore some of the consequences of his own actions in
ordering hospital inputs which can be substituted for his own, since the cost
of such behavior is spread over all patients of all physicians. One
testable implication of this argument is that overuse should get worseas
hospital and physician staff size grow larger.
The alternative "hospital administrationutility—maximization" models
developed by Feldstein and Newhouse make no direct prediction about
physician—hospital input ratios, since they do not treat non—salaried
physician time as a productive input. The result ofoveruse of hospital
relative to physician input would, however, be consistentwith this kind of
theory if higher "quality" is equated with more hospital and lessphysician
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input. -Whetherhospital administrators, who run the hospital according
to this theory, actually judge quality In this way or not Is unknown.
It should be emphasized that, inasmuch as this is a production function
estimate, these results do not bear directly on the question of whether
physicians can create demand for hospital services. As in other production
function studies, we do not ask whether the output should have been produced,
or why it was produced; we only ask about the relationship between outputs
and inputs. These results do, however, bear indirectly on the question of
demand creation, in that they indicate the maximum extent of demand creation,
at least as far as physicians directly are concerned. That is, they indicate
the maximum amount of Increase in output that could be attributed to demand
creation by additional physicians when all hospital inputs are held constant.
However, since inputs and outputs are not measured in per capita terms, the
results are not directly comparable to those from demand studies.
4. The Sample.
A sample of 165 predominantly rural counties in the 9 midwestern states
was selected. Each of these counties had throughout the period 1966—72
just one short—term general hospital with more than 50 beds, so that it is
reasonable to suppose that the great bulk of hospital care provided by physicians
in that county was provided at the sample hospital. The intent was to choose
approximately 50 hospitals In each of four categories: not—for—profit, 50—100
beds in 1966; governmental, 50—100 beds in 1966; not—for—profit, over 100 beds;
andgovernmental,over 100 beds. There was not a sufficiently large
number of hospitals with reasonably complete data in the third and fourth
P categoriesto permit 50 observations ,thesecond category10
was slightly oversampled, and later editing reduced the sample size in
all categories. However, since the sample was non—random to beginwith,
these characteristics did not seem to justify a complex procedure of
stratifying or replacing observations excluded by editing, which would have
required adding observations from non—Midwestern states. Editing consisted
of removing hospitals for which data was missing, and removing onehospital
which, though classified in 1966 as short term, changed to long—term in some
subsequent years. Data on these hospitals for 1966—72 from the American
Hospital Association Annual Survey was obtained. The American Medical
Association's Distribution of Physicians data was used to list the number
of patient care physicians of various types in each of these counties.
This means that my measure of physician input is a measure of the
number of physicians available for patient care in the county. This is
obviously not the measure of physician input most desirable for production
function estimates. However, it is the level of input that is likely to be
manipulable by policy. That is, public policy has been and is generally
directed at getting more physicians to locate in rural areas. It is not
directed at controlling the allocation of their time. Thus my results show
what may be expected in terms of hospital output from adding or removing
physicians.
While it has not yet occurred, it is conceivable that hospital staff
appointments might be a matter of public policy. For a single year (1972)
I obtained data from the Social Security Administration's MasterProvider
File on the number of staff physicians at each of thesample hospitals, and
on a finer breakdown of non—physician personnel into categories. This data
is provided periodically by all participating hospitalsas part of the
Medicare certification program.11
5. Functional Forms.
A Cobb—Douglas function is probably the most convenient functional
form to use in estimating production functions. Whether it is appropriate
is another matter. One problem that arose in Reirihardt's study is not
present here. In the physician's office, output can be produced even if
zero aides are employed. The four inputs that I use in most of the estimates
are hospital beds, non—physician hospital personnel (full—time equivalents),
other non—labor hospital inputs (meals, drugs, etc.) and physicians. Each
of these inputs would appear to be essential. Hence, the requirement of
the Cobb—Douglas form that every input be positive is not onerous. A
more serious restriction of the Cobb—Douglas form is that it constrains the
elasticity of substitution to unity. Other forms are available which do
not require this constraint, but their use raises more complex estimation
problems. Since a priori we do not know whether the Cobb—Douglas form is
reasonable or not, I have followed Feldstein [1967, chapter 4], in first
estimating that form and then considering alternative specifications only
ifthe Cobb—Douglas form appears "unreasonable" Judgment is obviously
involved here.
Whenphysicians or personnel are disaggregated into specialty types,
zero observations do occur. Results are obtained both using the Cobb—Douglas
functional form, but with a positive constant (one) added to all values of
these variables, and using the "transcendental" form suggested by Reinhardt (1972).
6. Variables.
For the cross—sections 1966—71, and for the pooled cross—sections, values
of both beds and personnel were taken from the American Hospital Association's
Guide Issue. A variable to represent non—labor inputs other than beds was12
constructed by subtracting from non—labor expense the product (BEDS X1000),
where $1000 is an estimate of the depreciationexpense on beds alone.
Sensitivity of the results to this assumption will be discussed below.
Output was measured by the number of cases treated, as measured by the number
of admissions. While it would have been desirable to havean explicit measure
of casemix, such data were not available. Because thesample hospitals are
the sole hospitals serving relatively homogeneous populations andare not
major teaching hospitals, variation in casemix is not likely to begreat. The
output of the hospital is assumed to a "treated case." Each case is treated to
the same degree; quality is assumed to be unrelated toinput mix, and days
of stay are assumed not to be of value in themselves. Fuchs(1969) has noted
that it is not even clear whether additional days ofstay should be treated
as beneficial, because they mean more bed and board, or as detrimental,
because they delay the patient's resumption of normal activities.
7.Results.
Table 1 indicates the results using total patient care physicians (MD)
as a measure of physician input, and hospital full—time—equivalent non—
physician personnel as a measure of the non—physician labor input. The
coefficient on the physician input, the elasticity of admissions withrespect
to the number of physicians in the county, is always significant, and in the
range of 0.11 to 0.17.2 Personnel and non—labor expense are 1ikeise always
2One implication of these resultsis that increased medical staff will
lower cost per admission. Cost functions that were actually estimated
with this data do indeed show that hospitals in counties with more
physicians or with more active medical staff members tend to have lower
costs per admission or per patient day. These results contradict the findings
of Davis (1974) and Manning (1973) which indicate that, in the hospitals in
in theii data, more medical staff members meant higher costs. They attributed
these higher costs to the difficulties of coordinating larger medical staffs.
Une way to resolve this apparent conflict is to note that the hospitals
(continued on following page...)13
significant. Measured hospital productivity decreased during thisperiod
at a rate of about three percent per year. Beds issignificant only for
non—profit hospitals; except for this difference, the production function
does not appear to differ across hospitaltypes. Not—for—profit hospitals
above 100 beds display approximately constant returnsto scale, while for all
other hospital subsamples the sum of coefficients issignificantly less than
unity. Large hospitals overall have returns to scale notsignificantly
different from unity, while the full sample showsdecreasing returns to scale.
The most likely reason for the insignificance of bedsis the high
correlation of this variable with personnel (r =.91).High multicollinearity
is to be expected in production functionestimates; perhaps its existence
might explain why Feldstein's results for British hospitalswere "unreasonable,"
with low or insignificant coefficients for suchobviously important inputs
as nurses. Heteroskedasticity was anticipated, but did notoccur; error
variances were almost identical for each quartile.
The possibility of excess capacity inany of the inputs is disturbing
in any production function study. It is evenmore disturbing here because
the measured amount of one inputmay well be correlated with the extent of
excess capacity in the other outputs. If it is supposed thathospitals may
have excess capacity in the hospital inputs(beds, personnel, and other
2(cont'd)
Davis and Manning looked at were primarily in SMSA'sor at least in areas
in which physicians might be likely to holdappointments at more than one
hospital. In such a situation, larger numbers of staff membersmight well not mean much more physician timeiflput, but would mean that each
physician would bear a smaller share of the costs of hiscost—increasing actions.
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non—labor inputs), and if physicians can in part create or activate demand
for hospital care, then It is possible that any observed increase inoutput
related to presence of larger numbers of physicians, observed hospital
inputs held constant, may not in fact reflect physician input productivity.
Instead, we may only be observing more intensive use of previously under-
utilized hospital inputs. Even if physician hospital inputs actually rise,
the total change in hospital output would be the sum of the direct effect
of physician inputs, holding the utilization of hospital inputsconstant,
plus the increase in output arising from the greater flows of productive
services from the hospital inputs.
In order to determine whether the estimates presented above can properly
be thought of as production functions, it is useful to determine whether
the measured effect of physicans on output varies with the level of
hospital excess capacity. For the lower the level of excess capacity, the
closer the coefficient on physicians will approximate the trueoutput
elasticity. The average accupancy rates of all hospitals in the sample
is 70 percent. A subsample of these hospitals withoccupancy rates (in any
year) greater than 75 percent was selected. The estimated production
function is shown in the second—last line of Table 1. The values of
coefficients on all variables, including physicians, are practically unchanged
from the full sample results. It does notappear that excess capacity in
hosiptal inputs, if any, varies with the level of physician inputs.3
0ccupancy rates of less than 100percent do not necessarily indicate
excess capacity, because a hospital faced with demand which is stochastic
over short periods of time would want to have some empty beds on average.
An ideal occupancy rate for all hospitals of about 80 percent is sometimes
suggested in the literature, and for the isolated rural hospitals in this
sample a target of 75 percent might not be inappropriate.15
p
Ofcourse, If additional physicians mean no physician input, or ifnone
of the hospitals ever reach a capacityconstraint, then this argument does not
hold. But neither of these suppositions seems plausible.
Finally, comparison of the first and last lines in Table 1 indicates
that omission of the physician input did not bias estimates of returnsto
scale. Omission of physicians does, however, lead to an overestimate of both
the effect of personnel and of the rate of decrease inproductivity over time.
Adding the physician input makes only a modest contribution to the explanatory
power of the regression, as might be expected given the high multicollinearity
of the input variables.
Table 2 shows the result of a similar estimate using disaggregated
measures of physician input. (For each of these physician measures, a
constant (1) was added to prevent zero observations.) The explanatory
power of the regression is not appreciably improved by this change, but the
resultsdo shed some lighton the way hospital outputresponds to sub—
specialities. (The coefficient on the time variable Is almost the same as in
Table 1, and so is omitted.) Not surprisingly, hospital based specialists,
uncommon in hospitals under 100 beds anyway, tend to depress output there, prob-
ablybecause their presence is a proxy for case complexity. Similarly, medical
specialists(internists, pediatricians, etc.) tend to affect output only in the
large hospitals. Both surgical specialists and GP's havepositive output
elasticitieseverywhere. Interpretation of the coefficients on GP's
andsurgeons can be simplified by converting the elasticities into marina1
products per physician. Table 3 shows that the marginal product of a
physicianis about 35admissions per year. As might be expected, the marginal16
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productis higher for surgeons than GP's, and the difference tends to widen
in the larger hospitals and counties where specialization by surgeons may be
carried to a greater extent. The purely hospital based physicians have
a high marginal product in the larger hospitals.
What is perhaps most striking about these figures is that they suggest that
the hospital workload of the marginal physician is less than one admission per
week, even for surgeons. Hughes et al (1972) have found the average complexity
of operations performed by surgeons in their sample was 0.94 hernia equivalent,
and the mean workload was 4.3 HE per week. The admissions to our sample
hospitals are unlikely to be more complex than one HE. Our results
therefore suggest that the marginal surgical workload is less than one
HE per week. This shortfall of incremental workload relative to mean workload
implies either that additional surgeons have low workloads or that the
presence of an additional surgeon in a county, even if he shares the work—
equally with others, reduces the average workload of all. If an average work-
load of 4.3 HE is regarded as evidence of underutilization of surgical manpower,
the results obtained here suggest that, at the margin, underutilization is even
4
more severe.
4The specification usedby Reinhardt was also applied to this set of data.
That specification takes logarithms of all inputs which are theoretically
needed in positive amounts, but is log—linear and log—quadratic in other
inputs. The particular specification used was:
q =A+ l persnl + 2 beds + 63 nlxp + l GP's + 2 SURSPEC
+ MEDSPEC + OTHSPEC+HOSPBDS + 6 (ff')2
where lower case variables represent logarithms.
The results are roughly similar to those in Tables 2 and 3. For example,
for the full sample, P was .869 (vs. .869 in Table 2) and the marginal
admissions product for a GP was 38.4 (vs. 31.3) and for a surgical specialist
54.7 (vs. 46.0).17
Since many of the measures of input used here are obviously very crude,
it seems appropriate to test the sensitivity of the results to alternative
measures. Table 4 presents the results of such tests.
Output has been measured by the admission or case treated. I have argued
that "quality" or casemix is not likely to differ in a systematic way across the
sample hospitals, since the hospitals are stratified by size and since the
populations served are all from relatively rural midwestern counties. One
attempt to control for "quality" would be by introducing the number of approvals
(of education programs) and accreditations, as well as the number of facilities
at the hospital as independent variables (line 1, Table 4). While approvals were
signifiiant and positively related to admissions (somewhat unexpectedly), its
inclusion did not affect the production function coefficients nor contribute
appreciably to the explanatory power of the regression. The number of facilities
was not significant.
Measuring hospital labor input with the number of full—time—equivalent
personnel and the physician input by the number of practicing physicians in
the county is obviously imperfect. One possible way to improve the measure
of labor input is to follow Feldstein's procedure with British hospitals and
use payroll expense. If personnel are heterogeneous, if relative wages
reflect relative marginal products, and if absolute wage levels do not
differ, the implicit weighting by marginal product should provide a better
input measure than does just counting all employees equally. Even though
there is no reason to suppose that quality—constant wage levels do differ, this
error may not be too severe. Lines 3 in Table 4 show the result of replacing
personnel with payroll.18
.
Ingeneral, payroll did not improve, and sometimes worsened theexplanatory
power of the regression. The only exception is in the case of smaller not—for—
prof it hospitals. The only other charge was an increase in the coefficienton
beds. A final test was to replace the measure of bedcost used in calculating
non—labor input from one in which the annual cost ofa bed was figured at
$1000 to one in which the cost was set at $3500.Except for the expected change
in the relative magnitudes of the BED and NLXPcoefficients, the results were
unaffected.
Since it is unclear whether hospital outputs respond immediately to the
presence of all inputs, espicially beds, medical staff, and specialized
facilities, since the precise dating of when an input was actually available
is questionable in the data, and since standard errorsmay be understated owing
to the presence of serial correlation, results were also obtained usingseven—
year average values for each hospital for inputs and outputs. The results are
shown on line 5, Table 4. The results arevery similar to the pooled results of
Table 1, except that beds is now insignificant.
8. Length of Stay
Holding beds constant, the only ways physician input (or any other input)
can increase the number of cases treated are either by increasing theoccupancy
rate or by reducing length of stay. Feldsteins results for Great Britain
strongly suggest that when output is increased, by increased medical input or
other input, average duration of stay declines but theoccupancy rate is only
slightly affected (Feldstein, 1967, pp. 78—79). Does additional physician input
in this sample of U.S. hospitals also increase output primarilyby shortening
stay? One way to tell is by including average stay directly in the production19
function. One can either interpret this as a "characteristic" ofoutput which
one may wish to hold constant, or as another output of a multiproduct firm.5
Line 2 of Table 4 suggests that reductions in stay are an importantpart
of the way in which physicians contribute to output. The coefficient ofmean
stay is negative and significant; its inclusion substantially improves the R2.
The coefficient on MD's falls to about one—third of its former value, the
coefficients on personnel and LNIP fall by 25—35 percent, while the coefficient
on beds increases substantially. Since the percentage increase in cases treated
is much smaller when stay is held constant than when it is left free tovary,
one possible conclusion is indeed that an important way in which physicians
"produce" admissions is by shortening the length of stay. It also appears that
one of the reasons why the effect of beds on admissions was relatively slight
is that beds produce bed—days, and that many of these additional days showup
as extended stays rather than new admissions.
There are, of course, some other explanations which are consistent with
these results. One is that there are substantial differences in case complexity,
and complexity tends to be positively related to the number of beds andnegatively
related to the number of physicians.
Another, perhaps more plausible explanation is indicated by Fuchs (1969) in
his review of Feldstein's book. He suggests that length of staymay vary for
reasons other than medical input ——regionaldifferences in medical practice,
socioeconomic characteristics of patients and area, etc. If physician 1.nput
primarily "produces" admissions, not days of stay, while beds and (to a lesser
5The latter interpretationis not, of course, consistent with the simple
Cobb—Douglas specification.20
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extent)personnel do produce days of stay, a consequence of reduced length of
stay will be a reduction in the ratio of medical staff to hospital inputs,
but the increased ratio does nothing to cause the reduction in stay. This
explanation would imply that there was, in some sense, an "excess" of days of
stay (at least in the sense of not being needed for the production of a
treated case) when medical input yas less; it suggests that some hospital inputs
cannot be substituted for medical inputs in the production of treated cases.
With the available data it is not possible to tell which interpretation is
correct. In order to do so, one would need to have much more case—specific
data on physician and hospital inputs and length of stay. In future work, I
intend to explore more fully a model of the hospital in which some inputs
produce treated cases, others produce days of stay, and still others contribute
to the production of both. S
9. Optimal Input Ratios.
If the hospital minimized cost for a given output, it would choose that
mix of Inputs at which the ratio of regression coefficients (output elasticities)
just equalled the ratio of expenditures on the inputs. (This assumes that inputs
are purchased at constant prices, or at least at prices which are proportional
to marginal input costs.) For those inputs for which dollar cost estimates are
available ——personnel,non—labor inputs, and beds ——theoptimal ratios and
the actual sample mean input expenditure ratios are shown in Table 5. For
physicians, the table shows the shadow price of a physician ——theprice per
physician which would yield a ratio of inputs which equals the optimal one. A
shadow price for physicians relative to all hospital inputs is also obtained by21
calculating the price per physician which would produceequality between the ratio
of physician costs to hospital costs andthe ratio of the coefficient on physicians
to the sum of all hospital input coefficients.
There are two main messages from thesecomputations. First, hospitals tend
to underuse personnel relative to non—personnelinputs ——eitherbeds or other
non—personnel inputs ——Inall but large non-profit hospitals.Second, the shadow
price of the physician's annual input into theproduction of hospital output is in
the neighborhood of $17,000 peryear. It is higher for not—for—profit hospitals
than for governmental hospitals.
There are other costs that should beconsidered, If only the data were
available. To the extent that Increased physicianinput shortens stays, to the
opportunity cost of physician Input one should add the explicit and implicitcosts of
home and other non—hospital inputs used to care for thepatient during out—of—hospital
convalescence, but subtract the opportunity cost of Increased "sick time"that
may accompany longer stays.
Physicians do not, on average, spend all of their working hours at the
hospital. Instead, the most physician working hours are spent in their
offices, treating and diagnosing ambulatory persons. How does this fact
affect the interpretation of the output coefficient?
Suppose for the moment that the ratio of physician office to hospital
hours Is constant across the sample hospitals. If what thephysician does
in his office has no effect on the demand or supply ofadmissions, if
physicians allocate their time to equate net income per hour worked atevery
location, and If prices reflect consumer evaluations, an appropriatemeasure22
.
ofthe opportunity cost of the time spent per physician in the hospital would
be average physician net income times the average fraction that hospital
hours are of total working hours.
But it may be objected that physician office time is in part spent
diagnosing or in other ways creating demand for hospital admissions, so that
the opportunity cost of an additional physician hour spent at the hospital
should include some reduction in demand as well as the explicit money cost.
Put another way, the effect of adding one whole new physician on hospital
admissions is the sum of his demand creation and production efforts, and so
overstates the effect on output of shifting physician time from office to
hospital holding total physician work time constant.
The answer to this objection is the point made above: that a prod-
uction function estimate, in effect, takes as given the requirement to produce
output. The value of what the physician does in office practice is, under
the assumptions above, measured by his net income. These estimates do not
tell us what will happen if we increase physician hospital input without
creating a demand for output; they tell us what will happen if the demand is
there. That demand for hospital care might shrink if physicians all cut
back on office time to spend more time in the hospital might argue for
fewer physicians in total, but it is relative input use that is important.
In what sense do these results answer the planner's question of what
will happen to hospital admissions in an area if he pours more physicians
in, holding hospital inputs constant? They tell him that if demand for
hospital admissions is related to numbers of physicians in his area in the
same way as it was related in the sample counties, then the increase in out—23
put is given by the estimated elasticities. On course, if he adds physicians
where there is little demand for their services in the hospital, then there
may be less increase in admissions.
These considerations suggest that it is useful to measure the
opportunity cost of physician hospital time in the way described above. Even
such measures are not easy to obtain, but the following calculations are
probably reasonably accurate. Average physician net income in non—metropolitan
locations was about $39,000 in 1969. For non—metropolitan physicians in 1969
hospital visits were about 25 percent of total patient visits. If one assumes
equal time for hospital or office visits, this suggests that physicians spend,
on average, about one—fourth of the work time at the hospital.4 If the
average physician "wage" per visit is a legitimate measure of his opportunity
cost, that cost is about $9750 per year, compared to a shadow price of $17,000
per year. The conclusion then is that there is overuse of hospital inputs
relative to physician inputs in all hospitals taken together, and in all types
of hospitals except small governmental ones. The actual savings from moving
to an optimal physician—hospital input ratio in the average not—for—profit
hospital in the sample would be $144,000, or about 8 percent of total expenses.
To this should be added the net costs (positive or negative) of convalescence
out of the hospital owing to shorter stays. The relatively greater overuse
in not—for—profit hospitals, as compared to governmental ones, is consistent
with the notion that physicians may be able to control not—for—profit
hospitals more effectively than they can control governmental hospitals,
which at least have an identified political constituency.
10. Tests for Bias.
As dscr1bed above, the initial measure of physician input was in
4Even lessis, as suggested by Reinhardt, average time per hospital visit is
less than average time per office visit.24
.
termsofthe number of patient care physicians in thecounty. The ideal
measure of physician input that we seek could be defined as
=h•sM
where M is the number of physicians in thecounty, s is the hospital's
staff of active physicians as a proportion of the total number ofphysicians
in the county, and h is the average number of hoursper week worked at the
hospital by each staff physician. SinceniH is measured by N, there are
several possible sources of inconsistency. I willargue that the result
is that the estimates above, if they are in error, will tend to undestimate
physician productivity, and so tend to underestimate overuse of hospital
inputs.
First, even if h, s, and M are uncorrelated, M will measuremH only with
an error. This produces a standard errors—in--variables bias toward zero.
Second, if either h or sis correlated with M, the coefficient on M will
be a biased measure of
To account for such correlation, two things are done: First, data was obtained
on the number of physicians with staff appointments at each of the hospitals
in late 1972. The Social Security Administration'ssurvey also provides some
more disaggregated measures of the type of personnel. If the ratio of
physicians with staff appointments to total physicians in thecounty varies
across counties, and if it is correlated with one of the inputs, the earlier
measures would be biased.
Physician staff members were divided into twogroups:active staff25
members, and all other staff members (courtesy, honorary, etc.). A comparison
of the results for 1972 using alternatively all county M.D.'s and staff members
is shown in Table 6. The coefficient on physicians is only slightly lower when Md's
are used. When the sample is disaggregated, it becomes apparent that, at
least in 1972, there was some bias in the coefficient estimate for larger
hospitals, but not for smaller hospitals. There does seem to be a little
evidence therefore that overuse of hospital inputs may be somewhat more
severe than indicated above.
Second, it may be hypothesized that physician hospital hours and numbers
of physicians relative to hospital inputs might be inversely correlated. At
least, with demand held constant, the number of hours worked in total by a
physician may decline as the number of physicians increases (either because
price declines or because of some pro—rata rationing effects). Moreover,
as the number of physicians relative to beds increases, each physician
may apend less time at the hospital. This is another reason to suspect
that these estimates may underestimate the overuse of hospital inputs.
One adjustment that can be made is to estimate the effect of physicians
with the physician—population ratio held constant. If one supposes that
physicians work shorter hours (at the hospital or in total) when they are
plentiful, or if, as suggested by Reinhardt, the pace of work is likely to
be less hectic, then omission of the physician—population ratio will bias
the output—elasticity of physicians downward.
However, when the physician—population ratio (or its log) was entered, it
had a significant coefficient only for the small non—profit hospitals sub-
sample, and the change there in the coefficient on MD's, while positive,
was not statistically significant.26
.
11. Conclusion.
The empirical results presented in this paper suggest that, at least
for the sample hospitals, once a patient is hospitalized, there will be
some overuse of hospital inputs relative to physician inputs. It would be
possible to maintain the production of hospital admissions even while reducing
the level of hospital inputs, if additional physicians' time were added.
The reduction in costs from the hospital inputs thus saved would exceed the
increase in costs attributable to the additional physicians, at least if the
social costs are measured by the portion of physician net income coming from
time spent at the hospital. Whether these costs equal the social costs of
providing physician services is, of course, very uncertain, given the way in
which physicians are supplied. Nevertheless, if these output elasticitiesS
are accepted as measures, of the effect of physician hospital hours, and if the
cost measure is taken as appropriate, the conclusion is that the given stock
of physicians could be used more efficiently if physicians spent more time at
the hospital and hospitals eliminated some personnel and non—labor inputs.
This is inefficiency in the opposite direction from that found by
Reinhardt for office practices. However, it is by no means obvious that a
shift toward more physician—intensive production of hospital care, even though it
would lower hospital and total costs, would raise physician utility. For
reductions in hospital costs reduce hospital insurance benefits. Depending on
the amount and type of physician fee insurance, the result may be a decrease
in physician utility. Here, at least, we have a reason why resource
misallocation occurs.I
27
Onemessagefor policy is that what is likely to be important
is the relatively lowmarginalproduct of specialists, especially of surgeons.
Given the high cost of training physicians and surgeons, onemay wonder
whether the hospital output, even if that output is thought to be appropriate
in some sense, justifies those costs, Of course, in practice increases in
physicians are likely to be accompanied by increases in hospital inputs; the
hospital inputs mean more output, but also more cost.
Another message is that even primary care physicians ——GP'sand
medical specialists ——havea significant positive effect on hospital
admissions. If the goal is to increase the number of primary care physicians
without increasing the hospitalization rate, the analysis above suggests
than an appropriate strategy is to couple physician increases with hospital
input decreases..
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.TABLE 1
PRODUCTION FUNCTION ESTIMATES: ALL MD's
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: ADMISS IONS
(tratios in parentheses)
NON-
2 SAMPLE CONS- BEDS PERSON-MD' s LABOR TIME Z CO- n R
TANT NEL INUT EFFS.
FULL 3.9 .086 .52 .15 .15—.029 .9041145.864
SAMPLE (2.7) (16.4) (10.7) (8.7) (7.7) (41.1)
BEDS>1003.7 .16 .49 .16 .14—.030 .941 421 .857
(3.3) (10.2) (3.3) (4.9) (5.1)(29.2)
BEDS: 4.2 .002 .53 .13 .15—.027 .810 724 .658
50—100 (0.1) (12.1) (6.0) (7.3)(53) (32.7)
GOVERN— 3.9 .00 .57 .14 .17—.031 .873 615.807
MENTAL (0.01 (11.0) (:6.2) (5.2) (6.2) (19.7)
NOT—FOR—3.8 .18 .45 .17 .13—.030 .934 530.907
PROFIT (4.0) (11.2) (10.0) (6.7) (6.1) (40.0)
NFP, 3.6 .28 .37 .16 .16—.032 .979 240 .877
BEDS>100 (4.5) (6.0) (6.8) (4.2) (4.3) (33.8)
NPP,BEDS4.1 .091 .50 .17 .12—.027 .878 291 .700
50—100 (1.6) (9.5)(5.8) (5.3)(4.0)(32.0)
GOVT. 3.9 .004 .62 .15 .11—.026 .888 181.800
BEDS>100 (0.0) (8.5) (3.7) (2.2) (2.9) (16.3)
GOVT. BEDS 4.3 —.057 .53 .11 .19—.032 .778 434 .637
50—100 (0.9) (8.0) (3.9) (5.2)(43) (13.1)
OCCUPANCY3.9 .065 .47 .17 .19—.032 .898 463 .887
>75% (1.4) (9.2) (7.4) (6.1) (4.8) (49.9)
FULL 3.5 .088 .64 —— .18—.041 .904 1145 .849
SAMPLE (2.6) (19.3) —— (7.2)(10.0) (60.0)TABLE lÀ
SAMPLE MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS
(STANDARDDEVIATIONS IN PARENTHESES)
HOSP. HOSPI— PER- NLIP SURG MED OTHER BASED SAMPLE TALS BEDS SONNELMD's($thou)GP'sSPEC SPEC SPEC PHYS.
FULL 165108190 17.4 491 9.3 3.7 1.8 1.8 0.7 SAMPLE (60)(127)(15.4) (435) (5.1) (4.9) (3.3) (3.1) (2.1)
BEDS 60158292 28.3 77711.8 7.3 4.0 3.7 1.5 >100 (70) (154) (20.4)(561) (6.5) (6.4) (4.5) (4.3) (3.2)
BEDS 105 78131 11.1 3257.9 1.6 0.5 0.7 0.3 50—100 (24) (46)(4.9) (202)(3.3)(1.5)(0.9)(1.1) (0.7)
GOVT. 88 97171 15.3 4329.3 2.9 1.2 1.4 0.6
(45)(45)(10.7)(335) (4.6)(3.2)(2.2)(2.3) (1.2)
NON— 77119212 19.8 5609.4 4.7 2.5 2.3 0.9 PROF (72) (153)(19.2) (519) (5.6) (6.2) (4.1) (3.8) (2.8)
NFP BEDS:35168315 30.8 86011.4 8.4 4.9 4.3 1.7 >100 (80) (174) (23.9)(621) (7.0) (7.5) (5.1) (4.8) (4.0)
NFPBEDS:42 79127 10.8 3127.8 1.6 0.5 0.7 0.3 50—100 (22) (42) (4.6)(194) (3.3) (1.5) (0.7) (1.0) (0.5)
GOVT BEDS26143262 25.1 66612.4 5.9 2.8 3.0 1.1 >100 (48) (117)(13.7) (449) (5.8) (4.2) (3.2) (3.2) (1.4)
GOVTBEDS: 62 78133 11.2 3348.0 1.7 0.6 0.7 0.3 50—100 (26) (48) (5.1)(206) (3.2) (1.5) (1.0) (1.2) (0.9)




RATESARE RATESPER 100 PERSONS
POPU- PERSON-
LATION ADM ND NEL BEDS GP's SURG
SAMPLE(00) POP POP POP POP POP POP
FULL 28314.4 0.060 0.75 0.45 0.036 0.012
(185)(6.5)(0.025)(0.35) (0.23)(0.013)(0.012)
BEDS 40216.0 0.072 0.85 0.48 0.031 0.019 >100 (238)(7.3)(0.029)(0.40) (0.27) (0.011) (0.015)
BEDS: 214 13.5 0.054 0.69 0.43 0.039 0.008 50—100 (94) (5.8) (0.019) (0.31) (0.21) (0.013) (0.009)
GOVT. 271 13.7 0.057 0.70 0.41 0.036 0.010
(164) (6.5) (0.022) (0.33) (0.19) (0.011) (0.011)
NON— 297 15.2 0.065 0.80 0.49 0.035 0.014 PROF (208) (6.4) (0.027) (0.37) (0.27) (0.014) (0.013)
NFPBEDS:403 17.2 0.076 0.93 0.53 0.030 0.021 >100 (251) (7.6) (0.032) (0.42) (0.31) (0.012) (0.015)
NFPBEDS: 208 13.5 0.055 0.69 0.45 0.040 0.008 50—100 (99)(4.6)(0.016)(0.27)(0.21)(0.014)(0.008)
GOVTBEDS: 39914.3 0.066 0.74 0.42 0.033 0.016 >100 (220)(6.6)(0.024)(0.33)(0.18)(0.010)(0.013)
GOVTBEDS: 218 13.4 0.053 0.68 0.41 0.038 0.008 50—100 (90)(6.4)(0.020)(0.33)(0.20)(0.012)(0.010)





SUB— CON- BEDSPERSNL LABORGP' sSUR- MED0Th HOSP
SANPLE STANT INPUT GEONS SPEC SPEC BASED
FULL 4.1.068 .53.13.088.059 .028 .037—.001 1145.869
SAMPLE (2.1)(16.1) (8.1)(6.1) (4.9) (2.1) (3.4) (0.1)
BEDS>100 4.3 .14 .45.11 .049.080 .034 .038.033421.856
(3.0) (9.1) (3.7) (2.6) (3.8) (2.0) (2.4) (3.7)
BEDS: 4.1 —.001 .56 .14 .11.055 .001 .029—.043 724 .662
50—100 (0.2) (13.0) (6.9) (5.6) (3.7) (0.2) (1.9) (2.1)
GOVERN— 4.0 —0.0 .56.16 .10.071 .032 .003 —.016615 .810
MENTAL (0.0) (11.2) (5.3) (4.3) (3.8) (0.1) (0.1) (0.8)
NOT—FOR— 4.1 .13 .47.12 .082.046 .025 .078 .012530.910
PROFIT (3.1) (10.2) (8.2) (4.6) (2.9) (1.6) (5.2) (0.9) •
NOT—FOR— 4.4 .25 .34.11 .043.055 .068 .068 .028240.888
PROFIT, (4.0) (5.8) (3.2) (2.1) (2.0) (3.4) (3.4) (1.6)
BEDS >100
NOT—FOR— 4.1 .036 .55 .12 .14.065 —;057 .067—.019291.709
PROFIT, BEDS (0.0) (10.0) (5.0)(4.7) (3.3) (1.9) (2.9) (0.5)
50—100
GOVT., 4.2 .00 .60 .12 .063.087 .008 .00 .026181.800
BEDS>100 (0.0) (7.5) (2.0) (1.6) (2.6) (0.1) (0.0) (0.9)
GOVT.,BEDS 4.3—.053 .53 .19 .093.058 .021 —0.0 —.044434.643
50—100 (0.8) (7.7) (4.9) (3.3) (2.6) (0.8). (0.0) (1.6)
OCCUPANCY4.2 .017 .49 .18 .097 .12 —.004 .036—.005463.893
>75% (0.3) (9.1) (6.1) (4.7) (6.0) (0.2) (1.9) (0.1)
.I
TABLE 3
ANNuAL MARGINALADMISSIONPRODUCTS, BY PHYSICIAN
SPECIALTY TYPE, EVALUATED ATMEAN
(—= coefficientnot significant or negative)
SUBSAMPLE ALL MD's GP's SURG MED OTHER HOSP
SPEC SPEC SPEC BASED
FULL SAMPLE 35.8 31.3 46.0 36.7 48.4
BEDS>100 33.3 21.2 53.5 37.7 44.8 73.2
BEDS 50—100 34.8 31.8 54.3 ——
GOVERNMENTAl.. 32.6 32.3 60.5 48.3
NOT—FOR—PROF. 38.9 32.0 32.8 28.9 95.9
N—F—P,BEDS>100 34.7 20.6 34.7 68.3 76.1
N—F—P,BEDS 44.1 39.9 62.6 98.7
50—100
GOVT.BEDS>100 30.1 23.7 63.6
GOVT.BEDS 27.9 27.0 56.0
50—100
OCC>75% 38.1 38.0 84.5 44.3.
TABLE4
ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATIONS OF PRODUCTION
FUNCTION
FULL SAMPLE
PAY- PER- NLIP NLIP AP- FAC- AVG.
2 LINE BEDS MD's TINE ROLL SONNEL BEDS= BEDS= PROV— ILITIES STAYR
1000 3500 ALS
1. .064 .15—.028 .53 .14 .043—.00 .867 1145 (2.1) (10.1) (7.8) (12.0) (8.7) (4.1) (0.0)
2. .48 .055—.027 .34 .11 —.66.947 1145
(20.3) (6.1)(11.3) (14.3) (10.8) (40.2)
3. .18 .16—.061 .44 .10 .861 1145
(6.2) (10.5) (15.4) (18.7) (5.8)
4. .17 .16—.026 .55 .030 .863 1145
(5.1) (10.2) (7.1) (16.3) (7.8)
5. —.04 .13 .69 .11






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1972 PRODUCTION FUNCTION ESTIMATES
USING PHYSICIAN STAFF AND DISAGGREGATED LABOR
z o —S
U) U)
i—icz ou o I
FULLSAMPLE
1. .57 .20 —.01 .10 160 .908 (6.6) (3.8) (0.1) (3.2)
2. .55 .20 —.02 .13 .019 .911 (6.3) (4.0) (0.3) (3.8) (1.3)
3. .19 .00 .13 .018 .076 .056 .045 .40 .905
(3.6) (0.0) (3.6)(1.3) -(2.3)(3.6) (1.6) (5.6)
4. .18 .12 .018 .19 .040 .046 .045 .32 .915
(3.6) (3.3) (1.4)(2.8) (1.2) (2.9) (1.7) (5.7)
BEDS: 50—100
1. .55 .21 —.09 .088 101 .792
(5.1)(3.3)(1.0) (2.1)
2. .55 .22 —.10 .084—.00 .788 (4.9) (3.4) (1.1) (1.9) (0.0)
3. .21 —.06 .080 .00 .092 .059 .035 .38 .786
(3.3) (0.8) (1.7)(0.0) (1.9) (2.7) (0.9) (4.2)
4. .21 .076 .00 .12 .058 .051 .032 .30 .789
(3.4) (1.7) (0.0)(1.4) (1.1) (2.8) (0.9)(4.1)
BEDS>100
1. .50 .27 .11 .066 59 .892
(3.3)(2.7) (1.0) (1.2)
2 .50 .16 .08 .22 .045 .913
(3.3)(1.6) (0.6) (3.2) (2.1)
3. .16 .09 .23 .047 .038.038 .031 .37 .908
(1.7) (0.7) (3.2) (2.1) (0.8)(1.6) (0.7) (3.1)
4. .13 .21 .043 .27 .019 .031 .042 .32 .919
(1.3) (3.2)(2.2) (2.7)(0.4) (1.4) (1.1) (3.7)